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1  INTRODUCTION 
In The Netherlands monetary developments in the eighties were characterized 
by a remarkable increase in the quantity of money. Between 1981 and 1990 the 
ratio of broad money (at the time defined as M2) to national income doubled. 
A major part of this rise in liquidity holdings was located in the business sector 
(Figure 1). Therefore, during the second half of the eighties Dutch econometric 
research tried to explain the rise in liquidity holdings of Dutch firms. The results 
of these studies are mixed. Kuipers and Boertje (1988) conclude that the sharp 
drop in the labour-income ratio in the first half of the eighties, which proxies for 
the rise  in profitability in their money demand function, is  by far the most 
important explanatory variable of the increase in money demand by firms. Fase 
and Winder (1990) advocate the use of an error correction model in estimating 
money demand.  Sterken  (1992),  adopting  an  error  correction  specification, 
supports the profit hoarding argument but also finds that the financial trans- 
actions motive is a cause for the increase in the business sector's long-term money 
demand. 
In view  of these  ambiguous  econometric results, the  Dutch  central bank 
decided in  1991 to look for additional explanations for the peculiar liquidity 
behaviour of  firms in a different way, by conducting a large-scale interview-study 
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Figure 1 -  Money holdings per sector (percent of national income) 
Source:  Estimates taken from De Haan, Koedijk and De Vrijer (1992, Appendix I) 
among nonfinancial companies} It is felt that surveys, for all their limitations, 
may constitute a useful contribution to the more traditional forms of demand- 
for-money research.  2 The  survey outcomes  may  also  be  relevant  for  money 
demand research in other countries. The principal aim of the present survey is 
to get more insight into the microeconomic motives behind the macroeconomic 
liquidity behaviour of the business  sector in the  1980s.  Earlier Dutch  survey 
studies  on money holdings, by Nieuwenburg (1969) and Cramer and Reekers 
1  Simultaneously  with the present survey, a survey was conducted among 33 financial institutions. 
A more complete description of the set-up of the survey, the organization of the questionnaire and 
the answers to all questions can be found in De Haan, Koedijk and De Vrijer (1992). 
2  For a recent discussion of the liros and cons of surveys in macroeconomics, see Blinder (1991) 
and the subsequent commentaries~ BUFFER STOCK MONEY  289 
(1976),  did  not  deal  with money demand  behaviour  of firms  in  particular. 
Moreover, as the liquidity behaviour of firms seems related to their financing 
behaviour, the present survey also involves  capital structure.  3 The survey was 
held between June and September 1991. 
This article presents the main findings of the interview study. It is organized 
as follows. Section 2 discusses the set-up of the survey. Section 3 reproduces a 
selected number of questions and discusses the answers. Section 4 summarizes 
the principal conclusions. 
2  SAMPLING PROCEDURES 
The sample is organized to permit identification of the respondents by four size 
classes (by number of  employees: 1,2-19, 20-99 and 100 and more, respectively) 
and nine  sectors  (agriculture, manufacturing, mining and quarrying, fishing, 
construction, wholesale trade, retail  trade,  transportation, and  services  (ex- 
cluding financial and public services)).  The purpose of this breakdown by size 
and sector is to allow the sample frequencies to be reweighted on the basis of 
the composition of the actual population by sector and size. Consequently, it is 
possible to interpret the sample frequency  distributions as if  they  were drawn from 
the actual population. According to experience with similar quota-samples in 
The Netherlands, a minimum sample cell size of about 50 firms per size/sector- 
category warrants  such  a  reweighting procedure. Thus, the minimum target 
sample size is 1,800 respondents (4 size classes  x  9 sectors  x  50 firms per cell). 
The questionnaire consists of 45 questions, concerning aspects of liquid asset 
holdings and their relation to other assets and liabilities such as investment and 
acquisitions, bank borrowing, capital  structure  and financing.  In practice, it 
proves far from simple to phrase short and concise questions which do not give 
rise to interpretation problems. In an attempt to arrive at formulations in line 
with businessmen's perceptions, a draft questionnaire was discussed, prior to the 
actual survey, with a  group of large firms and a  group of small firms. Their 
reactions were taken up in a second questionnaire, which was presented in a pilot 
survey to  twelve  firms.  Of these  twelve  firms,  five  actually completed  the 
questionnaire. This high level of non-response was due to the fact that, when 
receiving the questionnaire, some firms were discouraged by the large number 
of  questions as well as their subject matter (sensitive, strategic information), even 
though the anonimity  of  the respondents was, of  course, guaranteed. Considering 
the high level of non-response in the pilot survey, it was decided to raise the 
requirement as to the number of firms committing themselves to complete the 
questionnaire in the actual survey, in order to ensure that the results would 
indeed be representative. In the end, it was necessary to ask 21,000 firms to 
3  Recently there has been an upsurge in the number of Dutch survey studies specifically dealing 
with firms' attitudes towards their capital structure (Cools  1991, Nationale Investeringsbank 1990). 290  L. DE HAAN, K.G. KOEDIJK AND J.E.J. DE VRIJER 
complete the final questionnaire. Among them  5,000 undertook to cooperate 
(25 Yo), of which 2,060 actually answered the questions (10 Yo). After elimination 
of 58 sets of answers which proved impossible to process and 174 outliers,  4 a net 
sample size of 1,828 resulted (nearly 9 7o of the firms approached), slightly above 
the  1,800 goal. 
The sample is randomly drawn from the address file of the databank of the 
joint Dutch chambers of commerce. Branch offices are not included since they 
are assumed to be insufficiently familiar with the requested financial data. As a 
consequence of  the random selection procedure, a fifth size class of'0 employees,' 
which was present in the address file, had to be included in the final sample. In 
view of the incomplete coverage of agricultural firms in the databank file of the 
joint chambers of commerce additional data was obtained from the 'Landbouw- 
Economisch Instituut' and the Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics. Due to 
a different definition of size, agricultural firms could not be divided over the size 
classes mentioned above. 
During the first stage  of the survey, in view of the unexpectedly high non- 
response rates, especially for small firms, it was decided to combine the sectors 
mining  and quarrying, fishing and  manufacturing and  to  allow for a  smaller 
sample size in the 1-employee size class (of 150 respondents) in favour of a larger 
sample  size for the larger size classes. In the latter group, as the first survey 
results already made clear, the bulk of  the corporate liquidity holdings is concen- 
trated  anyway.  Table 1  presents  the  composition  by  size  and  sector  of the 
(estimated)  actual business  population  and  the  sample.  As  already noted,  a 
relatively small number of firms without employees are included in the sample 
only because they happen to be drawn from the address file. The bias towards 
large firms in the sample is mitigated by reweighting, giving large firms weights 
smaller than one and small firms weights greater than one, in order to obtain a 
reflection of the actual population's sector/size-structure. This reweighting pro- 
cedure however does not influence the qualitative outcomes in this paper signifi- 
cantly. 
On the whole, the total number of respondents per size class approaches the 
targets reasonably well. The size of the sample seems in fact abundant when one 
realizes that similar samples out of  far bigger populations, for example in the US, 
had much smaller sizes (compare, for example, the US surveys of  Gitman, Moses 
and White (1979) and Pinegar and Wilbricht (1989), which had sample sizes of 
98 and  176 firms, respectively). 
4  The criterion  used for the detection  of outliers was an extremely  high level of sales per employee 
considering the industrial sector's average. We preferred a criterion that is independent of the 
research variable  (liquid assets). Nevertheless,  firms whose sales per worker are extremely  high, also 
happen to be outliers on the basis of their liquidity holdings. BUFFER STOCK MONEY 
TABLE 1 -  COMPOSITION OF ACTUAL POPULATION AND SAMPLE,  1990 
(NUMBER  OF FIRMS) 
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Sector  Size (Number of employees)  Total 
0  1  2-I9  20-99  100 + 
Manufacturing 1 
Population  140  8,000  21,820  5,100  940  36,000 
Sample  4  24  96  90  105  319 
Constraction 
Population  300  9,000  22,275  4,000  425  36,000 
Sample  2  33  120  78  59  292 
Wholesale trade 
Population  1,500  13,000  28,930  4,100  470  48,000 
Sample  2  23  91  82  57  255 
Retail trade 
Population  2,960  39,000  129,940  4,000  100  176,000 
Sample  5  42  153  68  16  284 
Transport 
Population  300  3,500  14,160  1,700  340  20,000 
Sample  9  45  162  77  40  333 
Services  2 
Population  2,800  39,500  30,875  9,100  1,725  84,000 
Sample  6  39  124  75  49  293 
Total, excluding 
agriculture 
Population  8,000  112,000  248,000  28,000  4,000  400,000 
Sample  28  206  746  470  326  1,776 















l Including mining and quarrying and fishing. 
2 Excluding financial and public services. 
Sources: Non-agricultural business population figures are taken from the databank of  the joint Dutch 
chambers of commerce, adjusted when necessary. 
The total number of agricultural firms is obtained from the 'Landbouw-Economisch  Instituut' and 
the Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics; unfortunately, comparable figures per size class are not 
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3  SAMPLE RESULTS 
In the following a selection of the questions is reproduced and the answers are 
discussed.  First,  the  survey  results  with  respect  to  liquidity  holdings  are 
presented, then those concerning the financing behaviour of firms. For the sake 
of brevity, analysis of the survey outcomes by (sub)categories of firms will be 
presented only when relevant. 
3.1  Liquidity Behaviour 
In the questionnaire, 'liquid assets'  are defined in conformity with the official 
definition of money at the time of the  survey (M2:  notes  and coins, demand 
deposits, short-term time deposits and foreign currency deposits). 5 The compo- 
sition of liquid asset holdings over the different components according to the 
survey is similar to estimates based on official monetary statistics.  Short-term 
time deposits  make up nearly half of total money holdings  by firms in  1990, 
demand deposits more than a third. The first question concerns the development 
of the liquidity position: 
(1)  Has the liquidity position of your firm improved between  1985  and  1990? 
What is the cause of the improvement/deterioration in your liquidity position? 
The  majority  of firms  (54~o)  characterizes  its  liquidity  position  in  1990  as 
stronger than five years earlier6; according to 27~o  their liquidity position has 
remained roughly equal, while  19~o records a  decrease (Table 2). In absolute 
figures, the increase in the liquidity holdings of the business sector between 1985 
and  1990  on the basis  of the survey can be estimated to amount to 49 billion 
guilders,  which  comes  close  to  the  rise  according  to  the  official monetary 
statistics (44 billion). An interesting outcome is that profitability stands out as 
an important indicator of the development in the liquidity position: improve- 
ments  in  liquidity position  are  recorded more  frequently by firms  with  high 
profitability levels than by firms with little or no profits or even losses.  The 
significance of profitability for the liquidity position is confirmed by the firms in 
the survey. Of the firms which report an improved liquidity position compared 
with five years prior, as many as 87~o state improved profitability as the under- 
lying cause.  In  addition, improved control of working capital  (more efficient 
inventory management and shorter terms of payment) are contributory factors. 
Finally, a smaller increase, or a decrease, in investment also plays a role. Firms 
5  Near-money  claims on the government,  another component  of  the Dutch M2, is abstracted from 
in the definition given in the questionnaire, because the business sector holds almost no such 
securities. 
6  The reasons for not going back further than 1985 are that the pilot survey  made clear that firms 
have serious difficulties  in providing  reliable  information  for prior years and the already substantial 
reduction of the number of respondents at that time. BUFFER STOCK MONEY 
TABLE 2 -  LIQUIDITY POSITION, 1990 COMPARED TO 1985 
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Assessment of liquidity position 1990 versus  1985 (To of firms concerned) 
By profitability I  All firms 
~<0  1-4  5-14  15 + 
More liquid  25  44  57  61  54 
Roughly equal  29  26  28  24  27 
Less liquid  46  30  15  15  19 
Total  100  100  100  100  100 
Causes of increase in liquidity  2 
Increase in profitability 
Improved inventory management 
Improved payment discipline of customers 
Lower investment 
Leasing instead of buying 
Level of interest rates 
Yield curve 








Causes of decrease in liquidity 2 
Decrease in profitability 
Slackened payment discipline of customers 
Higher investment 
Level of interest rates 
Yield curve 






i Profits as a percentage of turnover. 
2 Firms may have indicated several causes. 
which  consider  their  liquidity  position  to be  less  strong  than  in  1985  mainly 
advance a  higher level of investment  as  an explanatory factor. Additionally,  a 
decrease in operating results  and, to a lesser extent, slacker payment discipline 
on the part of debtors  also make their influence  felt. 
A  remarkable  result  is  that  interest  rate  factors,  which  are  stressed  in 
traditional money demand theory,  7 according to the respondents barely seem to 
play any role at all. This is peculiar, as the Dutch short-term interest rate during 
the period under review has risen more than the long-term interest rate, thereby 
in;eerting the yield curve. In theory, this development should have made liquidity 
holdings more attractive, encouraging substitution of securities into liquid assets. 
According to the answers to a survey question particularly concerning the choice 
7  According to traditional money demand theory the desired demand for money is determined by 
both short and long-term interest rates. For an overview of  money demand theories see, for example, 
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between holding liquid  assets  and securities,  the trade-off between holdings of 
liquid assets and securities turns out to be hardly relevant for Dutch nonfinancial 
firms. The results of the survey show that, at the end of 1990, a mere 3 ~o of the 
firms holds securities. A  total of 6 ~o used liquid assets to purchase securities  at 
any time in the past,  and another 7~o had,  at one time or another, considered 
doing  so.  Hence,  according  to  the  survey  results,  holding  liquid  assets  for 
financial transactions does not appear to be an important reason for the increase 
or the decrease in the liquidity holdings by firms. 8 The uses that firms do have 
for their liquidity holdings are considered in the next question. 
(2)  What general uses do you have for your liquid assets? Could you rank them 
in order of importance? 
In the business finance literature, as in the general macroeconomic literature on 
money  demand,  Keynes'  (1936)  transactions,  precautionary  and  speculative 
motives are distinguished as the principal reasons why firms hold liquid assets. 
A  transactions balance is needed to bridge the period between certain expenses 
and receipts. In addition, a precautionary balance is held because the exact size 
and timing of future receipts  and expenses  are uncertain.  Finally, a  speculative 
balance serves to permit prompt reaction to any sudden, attractive  investment 
opportunity. 
The transactions motive is most frequently cited by the firms (Table 3). Nearly 
nine out of ten firms list the making of current payments as a reason for holding 
liquid  assets,  while  more  than  50~o  hold  liquid  assets  for  rapid  payment  of 
invoices.  The  latter  reason  relates  to  the  shortening  of terms  of payment. 9 
Current payments is stated as the most important reason by 71 ~o of the firms. 
When  asked  what  percentage  of the  firm's  liquid  asset  holdings  is  usually 
reserved for making current payments (that is, for day-to-day operations), nearly 
one in every five firms appears to use its entire holdings of liquid assets for that 
purpose. 1~ The second place is held by the precautionary motive: for 45~o of the 
8  In this respect the findings are seemingly  in contrast to those of  Sterken (1992), Sterken introduces 
into the corporate long-run money demand function a transactions  variable which is a weighted 
average of current income and financial wealth. The income elasticity is estimated to be 0.39, so the 
adding-up restriction forces the wealth elasticity to be equal to 0.61. This outcome is interpreted by 
Sterken as evidence of a financial transactions motive in corporate money demand. In our view a 
strong wealth effect should, however, not automatically be identified with a financial transactions 
motive. 
9  For 7~ of all firms neither current payments nor rapid payment are reasons. A relatively large 
proportion of these firms (36%) state that they have some other (not specified) allocation for their 
money holdings. 
10  The transactions motive is also prominent in the US survey of Gitman, Moses and White (1979, 
p. 37), according to which 88~0 of the  cash  and  marketable  securities balances were held for 
transactions  reasons  (60.6~o) or precautionary  reasons  (27.3~o), while only 2~  were held for 
speculation. BUFFER STOCK MONEY  295 
TABLE 3 -  REASONS FOR HOLDING LIQUID ASSETS (FIRMS GIVING A CERTAIN 
REASON OR RANKING IN ~/o OF TOTAL  NUMBER OF FIRMS CONCERNED) 
Reasons  Importance  Reasons listed by assess- 
listed  rankings  ment of liquidity position 
1990 vs.  1985 
1st  2nd  3rd  More  Roughly  Less 
liquid  equal  liquid 
Current payments  88  71  13  3  86  82  90 
Rapid payment of invoices  51  14  25  9  57  41  59 
Buffer for contingencies  45  7  15  17  50  33  37 
Future investment  39  3  16  13  42  27  35 
Future acquisitions  6  1  1  1  5  2  9 
Future debt repayment  16  1  6  6  16  9  21 
Other  5  3  0  1  3  11  7 
Nothing listed as 2nd, 3rd  25  51 
100  100  100 
Note: Firms may have given several reasons, but of course can only rank one at a time. 
firms, liquid  assets (also) constitute  a buffer for contingencies. It is interesting 
to note that this buffering motive is stated relatively more often by firms whose 
liquidity position between  1985  and 1990 increased (50 ~o) than by firms with a 
decrease in liquidity (37 ~o). Nearly 40 ~o of the firms hold liquid assets in order 
to be able to undertake investments. Future acquisitions are mentioned by some 
(mostly larger) firms. With regard to unplanned  investments  and acquisitions, 
these liquid asset holdings concern the speculation motive. Finally, debt repay- 
ment is listed by 16~o of the firms as one of the reasons for holding liquid assets. 
(3)  At one time or another, every firm has reason to hold liquid assets. Suppose 
that your firm's turnover is 100, what percentage would you approximately wish 
to hold as liquid  assets? 
According to the traditional transactions  approach to the demand for money, 
every firm aims at a target level of their liquidity holdings for transactions  and 
precautionary purposes.11 Nearly 60 ~o of the firms in the sample indeed indicate 
that they have a  desired level of liquid  assets. The target level of the liquidity 
holdings of  the business sector in 1990 can be estimated to be equal to 5.2 percent 
of turnover. For the firms which employ a target liquidity level it is in principle 
possible to check whether they deviate from their optimum holdings at the end 
of 1990, by simply comparing the  actual percentage of liquid  assets  stated by 
11  Baumol  (1952), Tobin (1956), Beranek (1963) and Miller and Orr (1966) are classical examples 
of theoretical models of the transactions demand for money  by firms. 296  L. DE HAAN, K.G. KOEDIJK AND J.E.J. DE VRIJER 
them with their target percentages. From this comparison the conclusion can be 
drawn that there is  surplus  liquidity in  at least one out of every three firms 
(5~0 +28~o = 33~/o; Table4).  For  the  remaining  firms  with  liquidity  targets, 
actual liquidity holdings do not deviate enough from the target class medians to 
draw conclusions (see the explanatory note under Table 4). Hence, it appears 
TABLE 4  -  LIQUIDITY RATIOS: DEVIATIONS FROM TARGETS,  1990 
(PERCENTAGES  OF NUMBERS OF FIRMS CONCERNED) 
Actual minus  By assessment of liquidity position  All firms with 
target liquidity  1990 compared to 1985:  a liquidity target 
ratios  More  Roughly  Less  Total 
(in ~o points)  liquid  equal  liquid 
(rows add up to 100) 
-2.5 to 0  49  26  25  100 
0  to 2.5  43  37  20  100 
2.5 to 5  72  25  3  100 
5 or more  75  16  9  100 







Explanatory note: Liquidity ratios are defined as liquid assets as a percentage of turnover. In the 
questionnaire target liquidity ratio classes are defined, and firms are asked to indicate the class in 
which their liquidity targets fall. For the purpose of comparison to  actual liquidity ratios, target 
liquidity ratios have in this presentation been set equal to their respective class medians. Given a class 
width of 5 percentage points, this procedure implies that deviations of  less than 2.5 percentage points 
are inconclusive. 
that one-third of  the firms in the sample has surplus liquidity, two-thirds are near 
or on their target, and none has  a substantial deficit. 
Thus, according to the survey, a  majority of firms appears to take liquidity 
targets seriously, which makes sense as most sample firms hold liquid assets for 
transactions and precautionary purposes. However, at the same time deviations 
from these long-run targets  do occur. This  suggests  that liquidity holdings  of 
firms behave like  a  buffer stock, absorbing temporary discrepancies between 
purchases and sales. Central to the buffer stock concept is the view that shocks 
-  whether simply reflecting the unsynchronized timing of receipts and payments 
or  an  unanticipated  macroeconomic  disturbance  -  lead  to  temporary  dis- 
crepancies between actual and long-run target money holdings. J2 As a matter of 
fact, in the survey most surplus liquidity firms record an increase in their liquidity 
holdings  between  1985  and  1990  (72~o  and  75~o,  respectively,  see  second 
column). On the other hand, most firms which record liquidity decreases between 
12  Laidler (1984) gives an influential account of what the buffer concept is and how it relates to 
other money demand theories. BUFFER STOCK MONEY  297 
1985 and 1990 are still near or on their targets at the end of 1990. This suggests 
that firms tend to react more promptly when they are pushed below their liquidity 
target  than  when  they  exceed  it.  Although  this  kind  of evidence  is  far  from 
conclusive, 13  an  asymmetric  response  to  liquidity  shocks  seems  intuitively 
plausible  on the grounds that liquidity surpluses  are mostly seen by firms  as a 
luxury problem and liquidity shortages as a threat to the firm's continuity. This 
has  already  been  observed  in  the  early  US  interview  study  by  Donaldson 
(1969). 14 Also note that a  quicker response to negative shocks than to positive 
ones  already  is  a  characteristic  of the  transactions  money demand  model  of 
Miller  and Orr (1966).  Hence, as Ireland and Wren-Lewis (1992, p. 212) note, 
in models of buffer stock money it would be more realistic  to assume that the 
costs of holding too much cash are likely to be less than the costs of holding too 
little, is  Under  this  assumption  the  asymmetry in  the  deviations  could  be  ex- 
plained in terms of rational behaviour. A  possible asymmetric response may be 
important for monetary transmission,  as it would suggest that the influence  of 
excess  money  holdings  on  expenditure  is  smaller  than  the  effects  of a  cash 
deficiency. 16 
Of course, when actual liquidity holdings exceed the target, firms may attempt 
to move back towards  their  long-run targets,  by stepping up their  investment 
expenditures, for example. 17 In Table 3 we saw that some firms reserve part of 
their  liquidity  holdings  for future  investment  and  acquisitions.  It is  therefore 
conceivable that,  once these investment  and acquisition plans  are carried  out, 
liquidity holdings will return to lower levels.  According to the survey results  it 
is not very probable that this effect lasts long, however. A  majority (81 ~o) of the 
firms which hold liquidities  for future investment expect their liquidity holdings 
to decrease  only temporarily when  investments  will be carried  out.  The same 
holds for firms which hold liquidities  for future  acquisitions.  This  implies  that 
most firms replenish  their  stocks of liquid  assets  up to the previous high level 
13  It is conceivable that the forces that pushed firms above their liquidity targets were much 
stronger than the forces in the opposite direction. This is, however, not probable as the liquid balances 
of  the firms which recorded an improvement in their liquidity position did not increase more strongly 
than the liquid balances of firms with deteriorated liquidity positions decreased. Another possibility 
is that firms adjusted their targets downwards between 1985 and 1990. Unfortunately, this cannot 
be verified because the survey does not contain information on historical targets. 
14  This  observation is also corroborated in a Dutch interview study by BDO CampsObers (1993). 
Of the 250 firms in this sample 32 ~o considered illiquidity as a threat to the firm's continuity, while 
only 17 ~o fully agreed with the statement that a permanent liquidity surplus negatively influences the 
firm's rate of return. 
15  Until now models of buffer stock money usually assume symmetric responses to buffer stock 
disequilibria (see for example MuscateUi, 1988). 
16  This asymmetric response of firms to liquidity shocks may corroborate  some of the recent 
findings by Cover (1992) and De Long and Summers (1988) that negative monetary shocks have a 
greater impact on the real economy than positive shocks. 
17  This is what Laidler (1984, p. 20) calls the 'real balance effect.' 298  L. DE HAAN, K.G. KOEDIJK AND J.E.J. DE VRIJER 
soon after the investment expenses are done. As will become apparent in the next 
section, profit retention plays  a  prominent role in this. 
3.2  Financing Behaviour 
One  of the  most  important  results  of the  survey presented  so  far  is  that  an 
increase in profitability has lead to liquidity hoarding by firms. This implies that 
the major part of the increase in profits has been retained for future use,  Since 
higher profit retention goes hand in hand with a rise in internal equity (retained 
earnings), the profit hoarding which causes the increase in liquidity holdings by 
firms may simultaneously result in a lower leverage, provided that the expansion 
TABLE 5 -  PROFITABILITY, LIQUIDITY AND LEVERAGE: A COMPARISON BETWEEN 
1990 AND 1985 
Contingency table 
(percentages of total number 
of firms; rows add up to 100) 
Analysis of variance 
(average change in 
percentage points) 
Liquidity ratio 
Up  Unchanged  Down  Change 
Profit margin 
-  up  55  20  25  2.9 a 
-  unchanged  38  36  26  0.0 ab 
-  down  39  19  42  -  1.9 b 
)~2 =  52,0  F = 5.1 
Debt ratio 
-  up  32  22  46  -  3.8  a 
-  unchanged  35  33  32  -  1.6 a 
-  down  59  18  23  4.0 b 
Z  2 =  86.4  F  =  14.4 
Debt ratio 
Up  Unchanged  Down  Change 
Profit margin 
-  up  19  13  68  -  8.3  a 
-  unchanged  20  39  41  -  1.3 b 
-  down  39  13  48  -  0.2 b 
Z  a =  113.0  F = 27.5 
Explanatory note: The Z  2-statistic tests the null hypothesis of  no association between the row variable 
and the column variable. The F-statistic tests the null hypothesis of equal means. In all the cases the 
null hypothesis is rejected with 99 ~  confidence. Repeated t-tests determine which means differ from 
which other means: means with the same letter (a, b) are not significantly  different from each other 
at the 5~o significance  level. Liquidity ratio: liquid assets as a percentage of turnover. Profit margin: 
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rate of debt has remained  smaller than that of equity.  The  survey results  are 
consistent with this  pattern.  Contingency Table 5  shows that, out of the total 
number of firms which record an improvement in profitability between 1985 and 
1990,  a  significantly larger number  of firms with  increases  in  liquidity  ratios 
(55~)  and  decreases  in  debt  ratios  (68~o)  is  found.  Moreover,  analysis  of 
variance  shows  that,  on  the  whole,  firms  whose  profitability  increased  also 
achieved a significantly more favourable development of  liquidity and debt ratios 
than  those  which  record  decreases  in  profitability.  Hence,  as  a  result  of the 
increased profit retention the expansion rate of equity was higher than that of 
debt. Firms apparently preferred internal finance in the period under review. In 
order to check whether this preference for internal finance is time-specific or not, 
the preference rankings of different forms of financing is the specific subject of 
the next question. 
(4)  Please  indicate  which  of the  following  forms  of financing  you  prefer  for 
making investments,  and which  come second  and  third.  What  factors  are  of 
particular importance for you when choosing a form of financing? 
According to the answers to this question (Table 6), 75 ~o of  the firms follow some 
financing hierarchy.  The  overall preference rankings  indicate  that most firms 
have a distinct preference for using internal finance for net investment -  in fact, 
TABLE 6 -  PREFERENCE RANKINGS OF SOURCES OF FUNDS 
Preference rankings 
1st  2nd  3rd  Mean 1 
Sources of funds:  (~o of firms concerned) 
Internal finance  54  11  1 
Debt  18  40  8 
Share issues  3  7  30 
No preference  25  -  - 
Nothing listed as 2nd or 3rd  42  61 




Factors affecting the preference order2:  (~o of firms with preference) 
Credit rationing  35 
Tax advantage of profit retention over dividend payment  20 
Tax advantage of debt over equity  16 
External finance too expensive  17 
None, firm uses only internally generated finance  26 
l Following Pinegar and Wilbricht (1989, p. 85), mean ranks are calculated by assigning scores of 3, 
2 and 1 for rankings of 1, 2 and 3, respectively, and by multiplying each score by the fraction of 
responses within each rank. 
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one out of every four firms (26 %) uses internally generated finance only. Debt 
comes second and share issues third. This pecking order supports the outcomes 
of  the earlier interview study among Dutch firms by Cools (1991). The preference 
for internal finance is not a specifically Dutch phenomenon, though. It is also 
observed in interview studies in the US. 18 
Yet, one quarter of the sample gives no preference for any financing source 
at all, 42%  indicates a first but not a second preference, 61%  not a third. It 
should be noted that not giving a preference does not necessarily mean indiffer- 
ence towards different sources of financing. It could just as well mean that the 
firm practically has little or no choice between different sources, for example 
because  it  has  little  direct  access  to  capital  markets.  An  indication in  this 
direction is that most firms with no preferences are relatively small (having less 
than 20 employees), and that share issues only seem a viable  option for larger 
firms which generally have easier access to the stock market. 
Part of the revealed financing hierarchy could of course be explained by tax 
factors. In The Netherlands, as in most western countries, the tax regime favours 
debt over equity financing and, within the latter, retained earnings over share 
issues (see e.g. Borio 1990, Ter Rele 1989). A significant number of firms in the 
survey indeed states that these discriminating tax factors play a role. Tax factors 
cannot  explain,  however, why firms  prefer  internal  equity  over  debt.  Valid 
reasons for the preference for internal equity could, among other things, be 
extracted from the literature dealing with asymmetric information, i.e. the typical 
situation in which the firm's  management has superior information about the 
quality of the firm which the suppliers  of external finance have not.  )9 According 
to this theory, firms are faced with the consequences of the information asym- 
metry in the form of a higher price for the external funds (a 'lemons premium') 
or quantity rationing. The firm's management will therefore seek to minimize 
dependence  on  suppliers  of external  capital,  by  stepping  up  their  internal 
financing and/or by maintaining an ample stock of  liquid assets ('financial slack'). 
The information asymmetry will also make debt financing cheaper than external 
equity, because debt contracts are safer in that they limit the possible ways by 
which their holders could incur losses.  Hence, to finance investment, firms will 
first use cash flows  as  the cheapest  source, then debt financing, and finally 
outside equity financing. 
Indeed, a significant number of firms in the survey attribute their preference 
for internal financing to credit rationing and/or the expensiveness of external 
18  One of  the first survey observations of'pecking  order financing' was done in the famous interview 
study among US firms by Donaldson (1961). More recent evidence is provided by the US survey of 
Pinegar and Wilbrieht (1989). The pecking  order may not be universal, however. For example, 
according to Ang and Jung's (1993) survey  South Korean firms prefer debt over internal finance. 
19  Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) are among the first to explain capital structure by 
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finance.  It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  this  outcome  cannot  be  directly 
interpreted  as  evidence of asymmetric information because the  questionnaire 
does not discriminate  between the  asymmetric information  story and  several 
other plausible explanations for the preference for internal funds. 2~ For instance, 
high transactions costs including issuance expenses for outside sources, especial- 
ly flotation  costs  for equity, would  also  dictate  a  first preference for internal 
funds. Moreover, Jensen's (1986) free cash flow hypothesis predicts that under 
entrenched management (the case of high agency costs), internal sources would 
be cumulated as free cash flows, and outside sources avoided since outside debt 
increases  unwanted  monitoring  and  outside  equity  results  in  both  increased 
monitoring and  control  dilution.  Hence, the  observed preference for internal 
finance may be related to transactions  and agency costs considerations as well 
as to asymmetric information. 
An important implication of the observed financing hierarchy is that it makes 
the capital structure  of firms not so much a  goal in itself as the byproduct of 
pecking order financing in the  past.  This  observation is  in  contrast  with  the 
so-called static trade-off theory of the capital structure, according to which firms 
constantly seek a target debt-equity ratio by reshuffling debt and equity funds. 21 
Of course, if managers  move to their target capital  structures  by following a 
financing  hierarchy,  these  two  approaches  need  not  be  mutually  exclusive. 
However, the  process  envisioned by Myers  (1984)  and  the  survey outcomes 
imply that most managers do not even seek a  target capital structure,  as will 
become evident from the answers to the next question. 
(5)  Do you have a  target capital structure? Which are its determinants? 
Somewhat surprisingly, only 31 ~o of the respondents  state that they do have a 
target capital structure (Table 7), whereas 75 ~o proved to follow some form of 
financing hierarchy.  22 Apart from this main finding it is further noted that the 
proportion of firms employing a capital structure target is higher the larger the 
size of the firm (for instance 56~o  for firms with 100 employees or more). Also, 
publicly traded firms more often have a long-run desired debt ratio: twelve (75 To) 
out  of  the  total  of  sixteen  listed  firms  in  the  sample  have  a  target  debt 
20  Ang and Jung (1993) stress that in order to formally  test Myers' pecking order hypothesis, it is 
necessary to obtain measures of asymmetric  information  directly  from the firms  in the survey,  in order 
to identify differences in financing behaviour between low-information-asymmetry  firms and high- 
information-asymmetry  firms. See for such an approach with US panel data, for example,  Oliner and 
Rudebusch (1992). 
21  For a recent survey  of these and other approaches to the capital structure, see Harris and Raviv 
(1991). 
22  Pinegar  and Wilbricht (1989) conclude from their survey results that US managers are more 
likely to follow a fi.nancing hierarchy than to maintain a target debt-equity ratio. 302  L. DE HAAN, K.G. KOEDIJK AND J.E.J. DE VRIJER 
TABLE 7 -  TARGET CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
(~o of all firms) 
Target  31 
No target  69 
100 
Determinants:  (~o of firms with target debt ratio) 
Profitability  57 
Size of firm  46 
Ratio of fixed to current assets  32 
Uncertainty about cash flow  32 
Tax advantage of debt over equity  7 
Flotation costs  0 
Note: Firms may have indicated several determinants. 
ratioY Nevertheless, the small fraction of the total sample of firms employing 
a target capital structure implies that firms let the development of their capital 
structures to a large extent depend on their internal resources. Further evidence 
in this direction is the puzzling outcome that the minority of firms that do employ 
a target debt ratio at the same time state that profitability is one of its major 
determinants  (Table 7).  This  further  supports  the  pecking  order  hypothesis, 
according to which the (observed) debt ratio of a firm will reflect its requirement 
for external financing cumulated  over an extended  period which is negatively 
related to its history of profitability. Hence, the preference for internal finance 
not only makes the development of liquidity holdings, but also that of capital 
structures, largely profit-driven. Other determinants of  the desired debt ratio that 
are mentioned are firm size, the share of fixed assets, and the uncertainty about 
cash  flows.  These  factors  all  relate  to  the  business  risk  of the  firm,  which 
generates a need for a buffer in the form of a higher equity component of capital. 24 
4  CONCLUSION 
The main purpose  of the  present  survey is  to  investigate the  microeconomic 
behaviour underlying the demand for money by firms. In our view, the results 
of the  survey  provide  valuable  insights  into  the  short-run  dynamics  of the 
demand for money by firms. Firstly, the pattern that emerges from the survey 
seems to underline  the buffer function of money balances. Though confirming 
that many firms seek to hold a certain desired amount of  cash balance on account 
23  Cools  (1991) interviewed chief financial officers of publicly traded Dutch firms only, Of the 50 
companies in his sample 27 (54~o) employed a target debt ratio, 90~o used some other measure of 
equity or guarantee capital. 
24  See,  for example, Kale, Noe and Ramirez (1991). BUFFER STOCK MONEY  303 
of transactions and precautionary motives, the results also show that deviations 
from these targets  do frequently occur.  Secondly, the  survey outcomes reveal 
pecking order behaviour as one of the main microeconomic driving forces behind 
this buffer stock mechanism in money holdings by firms. Pecking order financing, 
notably the revealed strong preference of firms for internal finance, stands out 
as a crucial chain through which a rise in profits leads to a  similar increase of 
firms' liquidity positions.  Substitution  effects as a result of interest movements 
barely seem to play a role. 
The survey outcomes give some clues which may be of use for future develop- 
ments in the modelling of the money demand of firms. First, profitability is an 
important  explanatory  variable  of firms' money demand.  This  outcome  cor- 
roborates recent econometric research on the Dutch business sector's demand 
for money function, which successfully incorporates profitability as an explana- 
tory variable into the  demand for money function.  Both  Kuipers  and  Boertje 
(1988) and Sterken (1992) use the labour-income ratio as an inverse proxy for 
profitability in their reduced form regression equations? 5 The main contribution 
of the survey is that it makes clear that pecking order financing constitutes the 
major structural relationship behind the causality between profits and liquidity. 
A  second survey result which might give some clues for future improvements of 
buffer stock money models is the  asymmetry in the  distribution  of deviations 
from liquidity targets. Firms in the sample which hold a smaller amount of liquid 
assets than they consider desirable are not far below their targets whereas those 
with surplus liquidity exceed their targets by a considerable margin. This suggests 
that firms respond more promptly to negative liquidity shocks than to positive 
ones, which seems rational if  the expected loss associated with liquidity surpluses 
is assumed to be less than the costs of liquidity  shortages.  Incorporating this 
asymmetric reaction of firms empirically into the buffer-stock approach seems 
a promising area for future research. 
25  This  approach should not be confused  with that of Dutton and Gramm (1973), Karni (1974) and 
Phlips (1978). These authors use the real-wage  rate as an explanatory  variable, and for a completely 
different reason. The real-wage  rate serves as a proxy for the opportunity cost (brokerage fee) of the 
time spent by individuals to transform illiquid assets into liquid assets. Fase and Winder (1990) use 
the utilisation rate of the capital stock as a proxy variable to capture a different type of short-term 
dynamics of the  demand for money, namely money hoarding during cyclical downswings and 
dishoarding during cyclical  upswings. In their estimated demand for the M2 function for the business 
sector this variable was not statistically significant, however. 304  L. DE HAAN, K.G. KOEDHK AND J.E.J.  DE VRIJER 
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Summary 
BUFFER STOCK MONEY AND PECKING ORDER FINANCING: RESULTS FROM AN 
INTERVIEW STUDY AMONG DUTCH FIRMS 
In the eighties The Netherlands has recorded a marked increase in the quantity of money.  This 
development  was notably attended by a rise in money balances ofnonfinancial firms. In an attempt 
to trace the causes of this development, the Dutch central bank conducted a large-scale survey in 
I99 i. The results corroborate previous econometric research on disaggregate Dutch money demand 
functions which identifies buffering of profits as the main cause of the increased money holdings by 
firms. The main contribution of  the survey is that it reveals pecking order financing  behaviour of  firms 
as an important microeconomic reason for this buffer stock mechanism in firms' money holdings. 